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ABSTRACT 
Mainstream policy discussions take as given that the United States will 
and must pay its debts in full and on time, and that restructuring is 
legally and politically impossible. In our judgment, this assumption is 
unwarranted. Far from being unthinkable, under some circumstances 
restructuring the debt of the United States would merit serious 
consideration, and these circumstances may well be fast approaching. 
We diverge from the standard wisdom for two reasons. First, we doubt 
that payments on treasury obligations will necessarily take 
precedence over what the electorate sees as more pressing needs, 
including national security and price stability. In particular, we 
suspect voters may balk if told that holders of United States debt 
securities have ironclad priority over Social Security claimants and 
others with well-settled expectations of government benefits. Second, 
we think it wrong to equate restructuring with catastrophe. While we 
do not dismiss out of hand the dangers of not paying creditors in full 
and on time, we believe that—perhaps counterintuitively—the 
American constitutional framework could prove an asset rather than   
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a liability when it comes to handling severe financial stress. Our 
conclusion on this point follows from the insight that the very 
dispersals of power that can fuel gridlock can also serve to enable the 
United States to offer credible assurances that its new financial 
structure will be stable going forward.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the time has come to consider the (once) 
unthinkable idea that the United States government could restructure 
its finances.1 A debt restructuring could come about through 
 
 1. See Robert Jenkins, Think the Unthinkable on U.S. Debt, in SOVEREIGN 
RISK: A WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS? 86, 86–87 (Bureau of Int’l Settlements 
ed., 2013) (finding that whether the United States will “request a bailout” and what 
“writedown of US debt will be needed to restore sustainability to its fiscal accounts” 
are “not questions being asked today” but are “worth contemplating”); see also 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment on 
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negotiations with creditors who agree to altered terms or result from 
an outright refusal by the United States to meet its obligations.2 What 
is more, we suggest that a debt restructuring would not spell inevitable 
doom for the United States. In fact, if handled with skill—which we 
stress is a big “if”—it could even help lay the foundation for a 
stronger, more prosperous nation.  
We do not advance these claims lightly. We recognize this line 
of thought lies outside the bounds of mainstream discussions of fiscal 
policy, which take as a starting point that while taxes and spending 
(including spending on Social Security, Medicare, and other 
entitlement programs) are up for readjustment, the United States must 
pay its debts in full and on time or suffer disaster.3  
 
Default and Restructuring, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT? 169, 169–70 
(Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2012) (undertaking a “thought experiment” on the “default 
and restructuring” of U.S. sovereign debt while expressing the view “that such a 
restructuring would make sense only in extremely dire economic circumstances”).  
 2. See Mooney, supra note 1, at 170. This Article’s analysis is grounded on 
the premise that a debt restructuring would follow such a refusal. Cf. Herschel I. 
Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable 
Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1088, 1088 (1988) 
(explaining why, in a world with rational debtors and creditors, sovereign debt tends 
to be restructured rather than repudiated). Debt restructurings of sovereign nations 
commonly involve reductions of the principal amount owed, reductions of interest 
rates, changes in maturity dates or some combination of these approaches. See Lee 
Buchheit et al., The Restructuring Process, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: A GUIDE FOR 
ECONOMISTS AND PRACTITIONERS 328, 343 (S. Ali Abbas et al. eds., 2019).  
 3. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. GALE, FISCAL THERAPY: CURING AMERICA’S DEBT 
ADDICTION AND INVESTING IN THE FUTURE 1, 64–65 (2019) (maintaining that 
“[a]ddressing the [federal government’s] debt challenge will require both slowing the 
spending trajectory and raising taxes” and arguing that debt default could result in 
such “unmitigated disaster” that “we should do everything we can to ensure that we 
never have one”); EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY xxi–xxii (2015) (advancing fiscal reform 
proposals and characterizing debt default as “a tactic” so “cataclysmic in its 
implications that only a modern Nero would contemplate it”); MICHAEL D. TANNER, 
GOING FOR BROKE: DEFICITS, DEBT, AND THE ENTITLEMENT CRISIS 11 (2015) 
(concluding that, in large part because “all money borrowed today must be repaid 
eventually—with interest,” the United States must make fundamental changes to its 
major entitlement programs); Roger C. Altman & Richard N. Haass, American 
Profligacy and American Power: The Consequences of Fiscal Irresponsibility, 89(6) 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 25, 33–34 (2010) (maintaining “the only sound approach” to the 
“debt addiction” that imperils America’s national security and international standing 
is “a mix of spending reductions and tax increases”); Leonard E. Burman et al., 
Catastrophic Budget Failure, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 561, 581 (2010) (strongly endorsing 
spending cuts, “especially for entitlements,” and revenue increases to “stabilize” and 
“eventually reduce debt as a share of the economy”); see also ERSKINE B. BOWLES & 
ALAN K. SIMPSON, A BIPARTISAN PATH FORWARD TO SECURING AMERICA’S FUTURE 
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But it is precisely these assumptions that we think deserve a hard 
look. The harsh reality is that with total United States government debt 
of $22.72 trillion as of September 30, 2019, and projected to rise to 
unprecedented levels by 2049,4 a “fiscal gap”5 that is a growing chasm, 
and a volatile international climate, the United States might not be able 
 
8–9 (2013) (calling for “[s]erious [t]ax and [e]ntitlement [r]eforms” along with 
significant spending cuts to “[p]rotect the [f]ull [f]aith and [c]redit of the U.S. 
[g]overnment”).  
 4. Debt to the Penny, TRANSPARENCY.TREASURY.GOV, 
https://www.transparency.treasury.gov/dataset/debt-to-the-penny/table-view [https:// 
perma.cc/QBP5-KRBT] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). This number includes $5.91 
trillion of intragovernmental holdings, which consist, for the most part, of special 
United States debt securities held by government controlled “trust funds” and 
retirement funds, most prominently the Social Security Trust Fund and Federal 
Disability Insurance Trust Fund. Id. The United States Treasury emphasizes another 
figure, termed “debt held by the public,” which omits intragovernmental holdings 
while (somewhat confusingly) counting obligations held by the Federal Reserve. U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 
2018, at 19–20 (2019) [hereinafter U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT FY 2018]. Many 
discussions of the national debt use this smaller “debt held by the public” amount, 
which stands at $16.80 trillion as of September 30, 2019. Debt to the Penny, supra. 
Unless otherwise specified, in this Article, “public debt” or “national debt” means the 
total of “debt held by the public” and intragovernmental holdings. We include 
intragovernmental holdings in our debt figures because they represent important 
promises of the U.S. government to beneficiaries of key social insurance programs 
and are not available for other government purposes, including debt service and 
repayment. See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2019 LONG-TERM BUDGET 
OUTLOOK 5 (2019) (“If current laws generally remained unchanged, growing budget 
deficits would boost federal debt drastically over the next 30 years [to a] . . . level of 
debt [that] would be the highest in the nation’s history by far [and] . . . on track to 
increase even more.”).  
 5. See The Coming Crisis: America’s Dangerous Debt: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Budget, 114th Cong. 356 (2015) (statement of Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 
Professor of Economics, Boston University) (defining the “infinite horizon fiscal gap” 
as equal to the present value of all projected future expenditures less the present value 
of all projected future receipts); see also U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 
4, at 7 (defining the “75-year fiscal gap” as a measure of “how much primary deficits 
must be reduced over the next 75 years in order to make fiscal policy sustainable,” 
and reporting “[t]hat [the] estimated fiscal gap for 2018 is 4.1 percent of GDP 
(compared to 2.0 percent for 2017)”); Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Federal Budget 
Outlook: We Are Not Winning, TAX NOTES 617, 621–22 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he 
fiscal gap is an accounting measure that is intended to reflect the long-term budgetary 
status of the government” by answering “the question: to start a policy change in a 
given year and reach a given debt-to-GDP target in a given future year, what is the 
size of the annual, constant-share-of-GDP increase in taxes or reductions in 
noninterest expenditures (or combination of the two) that would be required, holding 
projected economic performance unchanged?”).  
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to keep all its promises, even if it wants to. That means that some of 
the commitments the United States has taken on may be reduced or 
even jettisoned altogether, and it is far from clear—at least to us—that 
payments on treasury obligations must be accorded the highest level 
of protection. The United States, after all, is a democracy, and voters 
may see more pressing needs for government expenditures than 
interest and principal payments on the national debt. In particular, we 
suspect that if push comes to shove voters will balk if told that holders 
of United States debt securities enjoy ironclad priority over Social 
Security claimants and others with well-settled expectations of 
government benefits. It is also highly plausible—again, at least to us—
that citizens will regard national security and price stability as higher 
priorities than paying the nation’s creditors.  
If we are correct in our suppositions about the American 
electorate, it makes sense to ask what consequences would follow 
from not treating the national debt as sacrosanct. The normal inside 
the beltway wisdom holds that failure to pay United States government 
creditors would be “unconstitutional”6 and certain—or nearly so—to 
destroy the nation’s credit.7 We take a different view. While we do not 
dismiss out of hand the dangers of borrowing and not repaying funds 
in full, we believe the United States Constitution does not bar debt 
restructuring and that our constitutional system could even turn out to 
be an asset when it comes to preparing for, withstanding, and 
flourishing in the wake of severe financial stress. Our conclusions are 
rooted in the insight that the very dispersals of power that can make it 
hard to get things done under the American constitutional system also 
enable the United States to give credible assurances that its revised 
financial structure will be a durable one.8 As evidence of our position, 
 
 6. See GALE, supra note 3, at 64; see also D. ANDREW AUSTIN & KENNETH 
R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEARING THE AIR ON THE DEBT LIMIT 8 (2017) 
(“There is little doubt that Congress has an obligation to pay its debts under a variety 
of constitutional provisions, including the Borrowing Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
and theories of vested contractual rights. The failure of the government to pay its debts 
would also appear to violate the Public Debt Clause.”); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael 
C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President 
(and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (2012) 
(asserting that failure to pay “bondholders, contractors, employees, and other persons 
entitled to money under federal law” would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Public Debt Clause).  
 7. See, e.g., KLEINBARD, supra note 3, at 159–69. 
 8. Cf. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT AND CONSTRAINTS 142–49 (2000) (exploring the challenges nations 
face in making commitments to engage in fiscal restraint in the future and suggesting 
that such commitments are more credible “when power is divided between the 
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we observe that the United States has successfully restructured its 
finances twice already: once in the 1790s under Alexander Hamilton’s 
debt repayment scheme and again at the start of the New Deal when it 
abrogated the gold clauses in its debt instruments.9  
To be clear, we do not argue that in an ideal world the United 
States would renege on its obligations. We hope—fervently—that 
those who insist that concerns over the nation’s exploding budget 
deficits are overblown turn out to be right,10 that gloomy predictions 
of sluggish future economic growth will prove wrong,11 that 
technological and institutional innovations will lighten the federal 
government’s health care cost burden,12 and that a peaceful world will 
allow the United States to cut military spending. But hope is not a 
strategy. In view of the financial position of the United States, it is 
prudent to think through contingencies. That is what this Article aims 
to do. 
In no way do we suggest that restructuring United States 
government debt would address all the nation’s financial challenges. 
But the fact that restructuring would not fully “solve the fiscal problem 
in the United States”13 is no reason to reject it out of hand. Our aim is 
to explain why debt restructuring belongs on the menu of potential 
 
executive, an independent judiciary, and a democratically elected legislature”); Julia 
D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103–33 (2006) [hereinafter Kelo’s Legacy] (describing how a 
constitutional system with multiple veto points over reconfigurations of ownership 
claims can promote the security of property rights). See also Barry R. Weingast, 
Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure 
Markets, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 305–06 (1993).   
 9. See infra notes 44–51, 71–96 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Jason Furman & Lawrence H. Summers, Who’s Afraid of 
Budget Deficits? How Washington Should End Its Debt Obsession, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-01-27/whos-afraid-budget-deficits 
[https://perma.cc/2SQU-SBNJ] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).  
 11. See, e.g., ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN 
GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 642 (2016) 
(concluding that the “headwinds” faced by the United States economy “are 
sufficiently strong to leave virtually no room for growth over the next 25 years in 
median disposable real income per person”).  
 12. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting 
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 3 (2017) 
(detailing how technological and institutional innovations in the healthcare sector can 
reduce costs).  
 13. GALE, supra note 3, at 64.  
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approaches to America’s financial predicament and thus to expand the 
set of policy options under serious discussion.14  
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I 
explains how the United States has run up a massive national debt 
while also granting trillions more dollars of claims (both explicit and 
implicit) on future productivity.15 Part I also details how the United 
States has effectively restructured its debt on two separate occasions.16 
Part II lays out the benefits of expanding the set of policy options to 
include debt restructuring.17 In brief, we argue that to do so is to 
recognize reality, given that it is highly plausible that voters will prefer 
debt restructuring to cuts in benefits, inadequate national or 
international security, or significant inflation. We also explain why the 
United States Constitution is not a bar to all restructurings of public 
debt. Part III turns to the question of how the United States might 
better equip itself for the road ahead and offers some ideas for 
institutional and regulatory reforms.18 We emphasize that failing to 
recognize that United States government debt, which holds a position 
at the very core of the financial system,19 is not risk-free carries risks 
of its own.  
I. HOW WE GOT HERE: WAR, ENTITLEMENTS, AND GOVERNMENT 
GUARANTEES (EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT) 
Alarm over United States government debt is as old as the 
nation.20 For most of the country’s history, the general practice of the 
 
 14. See Julia D. Mahoney, The Struggle for America’s “Fiscal Soul”, THE 
NEW RAMBLER (Jan. 4, 2016), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/political-
science/the-struggle-for-america-s-fiscal-soul [https://perma.cc/3FSW-CJNE] 
(arguing that the repeated failures of proposed fiscal reform packages made up of tax 
hikes and spending cuts indicate a need to expand the “menu of options under 
consideration” for putting the United States “back on a responsible financial track”).  
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147–48 (2017); see also Anna Gelpern, About Government 
Debt . . . Who Knows?, 13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 321, 321 (2018) (characterizing 
government debt as “a public institution that binds its constituents in a 
multigenerational political project” as well as “a public asset at the core of banking, 
capital markets, and payment systems”).  
 20. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS & AMERICAN POLITICS 1 
(1988) (documenting the “central role” the “idea of balancing the federal 
government’s budget has played” from “the earliest days of the republic”).  
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federal government was to borrow heavily only if necessary to respond 
to grave national emergencies—which generally meant war—and to 
reduce or eliminate the debts incurred once the danger had passed.21 In 
recent decades, this vigilance over America’s creditworthiness has 
broken down and today there is no longer a robust bipartisan 
consensus in favor of fiscal restraint.22 Instead, massive budget deficits 
have become the norm,23 and the American public shows little alarm 
about the situation.24  
 
 21. See BILL WHITE, AMERICA’S FISCAL CONSTITUTION: ITS TRIUMPH AND 
COLLAPSE ix (2014) (characterizing these “well-defined principles” as an “unwritten 
fiscal constitution”); William A. Niskanen, The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution, 
6 J. ECON. PERSP. 13, 13–14 (1992).  
 22. See Bill White, The Evolution of America’s Fiscal Constitution, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 321, 336 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 
2015) (detailing how in the early twenty-first century, “leaders in each major political 
party adopted spending policies largely independent of their tax policies,” with the 
result that “[c]onservatives no longer insisted on taxation so that the public would be 
truly aware of the cost of government, while progressives no longer sought to sustain 
the social safety net by limiting benefits to available tax revenues”); see also Michael 
Doran, Legislative Enrichment and Federal Fiscal Policy, 81 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
27, 49–58 (2018) (explaining how federal fiscal policy is now “entrenched” against 
deficit reduction). 
 23. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Federal Debt Is Rising. Concern Is Not., N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-
debt-trump.html [https://perma.cc/JM4G-4YR9] (reporting that “neither political 
party appears to be making a priority of debt reduction”); Brian Riedl, Why 
Washington Won’t Address Soaring Deficits, THE HILL (June 18, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/448897-why-washington-wont-address-soaring-
deficits [https://perma.cc/G9R6-YZ7G] (“Seemingly no one cares about budget 
deficits anymore. . . . The cost of paying interest on [the nation’s] debt is projected to 
become the largest federal expenditure within a few decades, consuming one-third of 
all federal taxes.”). 
 24. See J. Baxter Oliphant, Fewer Americans View Deficit Reduction as a 
Top Priority as the Nation’s Red Ink Increases, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/20/fewer-americans-view-deficit-
reduction-as-a-top-priority-as-the-nations-red-ink-increases/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2C8N-NDKK] (reporting the results of a Pew Research Center survey that found 
public concern about federal budget deficits decreasing even as such budget deficits 
have grown); see also Bill Bergman, A True Portrait of America’s Finances: 
Analyzing the Federal Government’s Fiscal Year 2018 Financial Statements, CPA J. 
(May 2019), https://www.cpajournal.com/2019/05/24/a-true-portrait-of-americas-
finances/ [https://perma.cc/78FP-WREV] (describing the “public reaction” of 
“deafening silence” to the “bad news” on deficits contained in the most recent United 
States government financial report).  
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A. Road to Ruin or Public Blessing? National Debt and the Creation 
of the American Republic 
At the time of the founding, Americans needed only look east 
across the Atlantic for signs that profligacy could bring low even the 
greatest power. Spain, the dominant empire of the sixteenth century, 
had fallen into steep decline after serially defaulting on loans from its 
European bankers and, by the end of the eighteenth century, had been 
reduced to bit player status on the world stage.25 France’s repeated 
failures to pay its loans on schedule had constrained its access to 
credit, fueling a fiscal crisis in 1788 that in turn sparked the French 
Revolution.26 And while Great Britain had managed to avoid default 
in the eighteenth century,27 in many quarters its burgeoning debt was 
viewed as a grave threat to public morals and honest government.28 
Among the sharpest critics of public debt were two thinkers well 
known to the founders, David Hume and Adam Smith. “[E]ither the 
nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the 
nation,” wrote Hume in 1752.29 Hume went on to catalogue the “many 
disadvantages” of public debt, which in his account include the “great 
encouragement to an useless and unactive life” of “idle people” who 
live off interest payments; taxes “levied to pay the interest on these 
debts,” causing “an oppression of the poorer sort”; and the rendering 
of the “public, in a manner, tributary” to the foreigners who “possess 
a great share of our national funds,” a state of affairs that “may in time 
 
 25. See MAURICIO DRELICHMAN & HANS-JOACHIM VOTH, LENDING TO THE 
BORROWER FROM HELL: DEBT, TAXES AND DEFAULT IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II 244 
(2014).  
 26. See Thomas J. Sargent & Francois R. Velde, Macroeconomic Features 
of the French Revolution, 103 J. POL. ECON. 474, 477 (1995); see also MICHAEL 
SONENSCHER, BEFORE THE DELUGE: PUBLIC DEBT, INEQUALITY, AND THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (2007). See generally HERBERT 
E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT 
(1995) (positing that France’s financial problems in the 1780s were aggravated by the 
United States’ unpaid war debt).  
 27. See JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE 
ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1793 88–134 (1990).  
 28. See ISAAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF 
NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE 43–44 (1992); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE 
FOUNDERS AND FINANCE: HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS 
FORGED A NEW ECONOMY 93, 103 (2012); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 32–36 (1969). 
 29. DAVID HUME, Of Public Credit, in TREATISES ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS: 
ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 344, 356 (1752). 
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occasion the transport of our people and our industry.”30 Smith 
sounded a similar cautionary note in the final chapter of his 1776 work 
The Wealth of Nations: “When national debts have once been 
accumulated to a certain degree, there is scarce, I believe, a single 
instance of their having been fairly and completely paid.”31  
The early historical record of the United States is replete with 
similar expressions of hostility toward public debt and its perceived 
tendency to corrupt public officials and enrich manipulators—as 
distinct from makers—of wealth.32 Yet debt’s perils were not the 
whole story. Having borrowed heavily at home and abroad to win its 
independence, in a sense the young United States owed its very 
existence to debt. And it was not lost on Americans that Britain’s near 
limitless access to capital markets had given it a powerful edge in the 
Revolutionary War.33 Future Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton made the case for prudent use of public credit in a 1781 letter 
to Robert Morris, the merchant and financial impresario then serving 
as the nation’s first (and last) Superintendent of Finance: “A national 
debt if it is not excessive will be to us a national blessing,” enabling 
the new nation to fund armed conflict and creating a “necessity for 
keeping up taxation to a degree which without being oppressive, will 
be a spur to industry.”34 Hamilton’s sophisticated grasp of the 
possibilities of public debt was consonant with emerging attitudes 
toward commerce and private debt in late eighteenth-century 
America.35  
Both Hamilton and Morris thought the national government 
needed more revenue to service public debt and establish sound credit. 
But under the Articles of Confederation, individual states could—and 
did—refuse to go along. A discouraged Morris quit his post in 1784, 
 
 30. Id. at 348, 350. 
 31. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 396 (1776). 
 32. See MCCRAW, supra note 28, at 93, 103, 333; see also FORREST 
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 93–94, 115–19 (1985).   
 33. See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 620 (2010); STANLEY ELKINS 
& ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 117 (1993) (noting that Hamilton was 
“intensely aware of the advantages” of sound public credit and of the fact “that the 
principal weakness of the Revolutionary government had been its inability to raise 
money”).   
 34. Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel, Cont’l Army, to 
Robert Morris, Superintendent of Fin., U.S. (Apr. 30, 1781).  
 35. See generally BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE 
AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002).  
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and throughout the 1780s, the United States remained in default on 
most of its interest-bearing debt.36 In addition, the market value of the 
paper currency—commonly called “Continental” dollars—issued by 
the Continental Congress plunged.37 The nation’s shambolic finances 
were a major impetus for the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that led 
to a new Constitution,38 one that “realigned incentives and authorities” 
so as to empower the central government to control its finances.39 
Interestingly, the new Constitution did not explicitly forbid defaults 
on the nation’s debt.40 Article VI simply states, “All Debts contracted 
and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation.”41 More stringent 
provisions, including one providing that Congress “shall discharge the 
debts & fulfill the engagements” of the United States, were considered 
at the Constitutional Convention but not adopted.42 
Once ratified, the new Constitution made possible a quick 
reversal of the nation’s fortunes. In just three years—from 1790 to 
1792—the United States laid the financial foundations for a secure, 
prosperous nation in place of one that was for all practical purposes 
bankrupt.43 Crucial for this newfound stability was the failure to pay 
in full the obligations taken on to fight and win independence from 
Great Britain. This point deserves emphasis, for the claim that the 
 
 36. See Farley Grubb, The Net Worth of the US Federal Government, 1784-
1802, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 280, 280–81 (2007). 
 37. See generally Farley Grubb, The Continental Dollar: How Much Was 
Really Issued?, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 283 (2008).   
 38. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 69, 69 (2016); see also Sonia Mittal et al., The 
Constitutional Choices of 1787 and Their Consequences, in FOUNDING CHOICES: 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S 25, 27–28 (Douglas A. Irwin & Richard 
Sylla eds., 2011).   
 39. Thomas J. Sargent, Nobel Lecture: United States Then, Europe Now, 120 
J. POL. ECON. 1, 12–13 (2012).  
 40. See Michael W. McConnell, Origins of the Fiscal Constitution, in IS U.S. 
GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 45, 49. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 42. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 377 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911); see also MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY AND 
THE AMERICAN STATE, 1783–1867 42–43 (2014) (reporting that some delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention “countered that ‘shall’ was too strong a word” as the “new 
government might not have the means to pay off the debt”). 
 43. See Richard Sylla, Financial Foundations: Public Credit, the National 
Bank, and Securities Markets, in FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY 
IN THE 1790S, supra note 38, at 59.   
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United States of America has always honored all its commitments in 
full exerts a powerful hold on the public imagination. In truth, the 
founders were nothing if not pragmatic and accepted that the principle 
of making good on all pledges must bow to circumstance. As 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in his First Report on the Public Credit, 
delivered to Congress on January 9, 1790:  
Every breach of the public engagements, whether from choice or necessity, 
is, in different degrees, hurtful to public credit. When such a necessity does 
truly exist, the evils of it are only to be palliated by a scrupulous attention, 
on the part of the Government, to carry the violation no further than the 
necessity absolutely requires, and to manifest, if the nature of the case admit 
of it, a sincere disposition to make reparation whenever circumstances shall 
permit.44  
Hardest hit were the owners of the approximately $80 million (in 
face value) of “Continentals” that remained outstanding as of 1789.45 
Hamilton’s restructuring plan “harshly discriminated against” holders 
of these instruments.46 Although allowed to swap their paper dollars 
for interest-bearing debt or specie, the ratio at which they could do so 
was a punishing 100 to one.47  
Owners of the interest-bearing national debt of approximately 
$79 million (which included roughly $25 million of state debt assumed 
by the federal government) fared far better.48 But even those creditors 
were not, for the most part, made whole.49 Foreign creditors (who held 
a total of roughly $11.7 million of the debt) by and large got more than 
domestic ones, with the French receiving about 80% of what they were 
 
 44. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FIRST REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CREDIT (1790) 
(emphasis added).   
 45. See George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, Fiscal Discriminations in Three 
Wars 7, 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19008, 2013). 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. See Grubb, supra note 36, at 280; see also Hall & Sargent, supra note 45, 
at 10–12.   
 48. The $79 million figure is Hamilton’s own and may be an overestimate. 
See E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776–1790 330–32 (1961) (pegging the total par value at about $74 million 
and attributing Hamilton’s larger figure to the challenges of obtaining accurate 
information about the state debts).  
 49. See Funding Act of 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138, 138–39 (1790); Peter M. 
Garber, Alexander Hamilton’s Market Based Debt Reduction Plan 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3597, 1991) (observing that Hamilton’s 
“prescription of full repayment of sovereign debt seems to have crumbled” under 
pressure). 
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owed and Dutch private creditors being paid in full.50 Domestic 
debtholders were offered securities packages with market values well 
below face values, resulting in significant haircuts.51 That domestic 
debtholders were so willing to exchange old debt for the packages 
offered is a testament to how low expectations of full repayment had 
fallen.  
Having pulled off the unusual feat of right sizing its obligations 
while convincing the credit markets it was unlikely to repeat the 
behavior, the United States became zealous in its commitment to fiscal 
probity. By 1811, the national debt had fallen to $45 million, although 
the outbreak of the War of 1812 caused the national debt to soar 
again.52 Logistical problems in military and financial matters plagued 
the national government throughout the conflict, and toward the war’s 
end in late 1814, it suffered the serious embarrassment of having to 
put off payments to creditors in what a recent report from the 
Congressional Research Service terms “unambiguous examples of 
default.”53 But the payment delays were just that: delays, not 
restructuring or repudiation, and America was very soon back on a 
strong financial footing.54 At no point during or after the War of 1812 
did then President James Madison, members of his administration, or 
 
 50. See Garber, supra note 49, at 37; Hall & Sargent, supra note 45, at 10 
n.16. 
 51. See Garber, supra note 49, at 3 (concluding that “a large part of the face 
value” of the debt incurred by the national and state governments prior to the 
Constitution “was effectively written off”); see also EDLING, supra note 42, at 96 
(noting that critics of Hamilton’s debt restructuring proposals “inside and outside of 
Congress had no difficulty detecting a breach of contract” in the terms of the exchange 
and that Hamilton defended his approach on the grounds that the debt conversions 
would be voluntary); Sylla, supra note 43, at 72. See generally Donald F. Swanson & 
Anthony P. Trout, Alexander Hamilton, Conversion and Debt Reduction, 29 
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 417 (1992) (providing an overview of Hamilton’s 
proposed debt reduction plan). 
 52. GALE, supra note 3, at 36. 
 53. D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HAS THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT EVER “DEFAULTED”? 6 (2016).  
 54. In 1977 and 1979, there occurred minor incidents that some characterize 
as technical defaults. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN 
WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED 
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 6 (2013) (arguing that a technical default took 
place in 1977 when one temporary debt limit increase expired shortly before Congress 
enacted a new debt limit increase); Terry L. Zivney & Richard D. Marcus, The Day 
the U.S. Defaulted on Treasury Bills, 24 FIN. REV. 475, 475 (1989) (recounting a short 
and quickly rectified delay in 1979 in interest and principal payments to some small 
investors holding Treasury securities).  
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Congress contemplate not paying the nation’s debts with dispatch and 
in full.  
B. From the Jackson Administration to the Gold Clause Cases 
A resurgence of federal revenues, together with popular 
enthusiasm for becoming “wholly” (that is, debt) free,55 led to the 
elimination of the public debt in 1835 under President Andrew 
Jackson.56 America’s interlude of national debt freedom soon ended, 
but public debt remained low in relation to the size of the national 
economy until the Civil War.57 Then it again exploded, soaring from 
$65 million in 1860 to $2.76 billion in 1866.58 The aftermath of the 
Civil War followed the same path as that of the War of 1812, with 
public debt steadily reduced thanks to rapid economic growth that 
swelled federal revenues.59 The commitment to repay the “sacred and 
inviolate”60 debt incurred to save the union was enshrined in the Public 
Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “The 
validity of the public debt of the United States . . . shall not be 
questioned.”61 The Public Debt Clause’s inclusion in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was largely motivated by concerns that a coalition of 
 
 55. CARL LANE, A NATION WHOLLY FREE: THE ELIMINATION OF THE 
NATIONAL DEBT IN THE AGE OF JACKSON 161 (2014) (explaining that to many 
Americans “[d]ebt meant dependence upon creditors, an obligation of the majority to 
a minority, a burden on the many to the advantage of a few”).  
 56. Id. at 159. The national government’s finances stood in stark contrast to 
those of some states, a number of which defaulted on debt in the 1840s after borrowing 
heavily for transportation and banking. See William B. English, Understanding the 
Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 
259, 259, 261 (1996) (“Between 1841 and 1843 eight states and one territory defaulted 
on their obligations, and by end of the decade four states and one territory had 
repudiated all or part of their debts.”); Sargent, supra note 39, at 25 (noting that 
proposals for the federal government to assume state debts were considered but 
ultimately rejected); John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and 
Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. 
HIST. 211, 211 (2005). 
 57. See Richard Sylla, US Government Debt Has Always Been Different, in 
IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 1, 7. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.     
 60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865).   
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.  
 Restructuring United States Government Debt  1297 
southern Democrats and northerners might seek to refuse to pay the 
Civil War debt.62  
The United States’ 1917 entry into World War I marked yet 
another run up of public debt in war followed by a decline in peace.63 
But there the pattern ends, for the 1920s marks the final era of 
significant United States debt retirement.64  
The Great Depression’s severity paved the way for the “bold, 
persistent experimentation” of the New Deal.65 What emerged may—
with justification—be called a “new fiscal constitution.”66 Federal 
government spending increased dramatically,67 and a federal system 
of old-age benefits, a program now commonly described as having 
“quasi-constitutional” status,68 was established by the Social Security 
Act of 1935.69 Keenly aware of the federal government’s limited 
capacity to bear risk, President Franklin Roosevelt stressed that Social 
Security was designed with the “protection of the credit structure of 
the [United States]” in mind.70  
Most dramatically, in early 1933 the United States went off the 
gold standard and in June 1933 abrogated the gold clauses in United 
 
 62. See Stuart McCommas, Note, Forgotten but Not Lost: The Original 
Public Meaning of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1294 
(2013) (discussing why the amendment mentioned public debt).  
 63. See Sylla, supra note 57, at 7. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Governor, State of N.Y., Address at 
Oglethorpe University (May 22, 1932), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 639, 639 (1938). 
 66. Niskanen, supra note 21, at 13; see also J. Bradford DeLong, Fiscal 
Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 67, 83–84 
(Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998).    
 67. See GALE, supra note 3, at 39 (“Overall, the 1930s saw a substantial 
increase in the size of government. Federal spending more than doubled as a share of 
the economy, from less than 4 percent in 1930 to more than 9 percent in 1940.”).  
 68. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83–85 (2010) (characterizing social 
security as integral to “basic rules of political participation and citizenship”); Gillian 
E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2013). 
 69. See Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
 70. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, U.S., A Message to the Congress on 
Social Security (Jan. 17, 1935); see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 
FINAL REPORT (1938) (“[T]he fulfillment of the promises made to the wage earners 
included in the old age insurance system depends upon, more than anything else, the 
financial integrity of the Government.”); Julian Zelizer, The Forgotten Legacy of the 
New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration 1933-1938, 30 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 331, 331–58 (2000) (detailing the power wielded by fiscal 
conservatives in the Roosevelt administration). 
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States government debt instruments.71 A steep reduction in the dollar’s 
gold content followed in January 1934.72 Financial historians have 
classified the U.S. government’s actions as a “default,”73 and in its 
1935 decision Perry v. United States,74 the Supreme Court agreed with 
a disaffected bondholder that the gold clause abrogation was not 
within the authority of Congress under the United States Constitution. 
Invoking the Borrowing Clause of Article I,75 Chief Justice Hughes 
wrote for a five-justice majority of the Court: 
[T]he right to make binding contracts is a competence attaching to 
sovereignty. . . . The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to 
borrow money on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a 
power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may 
depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is one of 
the essences of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to 
authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money 
borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or 
destroy those obligations.76 
Justice Hughes also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Public Debt Clause. Although “this provision was undoubtedly 
inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the 
government issued during the Civil War,” wrote Justice Hughes, “its 
language indicates a broader connotation.”77 He continued:  
 
 71. See SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
FDR, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD (2018); Kenneth W. Dam, 
From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half-Century of American 
Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 504, 512 (1983). 
 72. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Financial and Sovereign 
Debt: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten, in FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES 141, 150 (S. Claessens et al. eds., 2014). 
 73. See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); Sebastian Edwards et al., 
The U.S. Debt Restructuring of 1933: Consequences and Lessons 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21694, 2015) (stating that the “U.S. did restructure its 
debt unilaterally during the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt,” imposing 
“a 41 percent loss on investors” in what “would become one of the largest transfers 
of wealth (from creditors to debtors) in the history of the world”); Randall S. 
Kroszner, Is It Better to Forgive Than to Receive? Repudiation of the Gold Indexation 
Clause in Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression 1 (Ctr. for Research in Sec. 
Prices, Working Paper No. 481, 1998). 
 74. 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935). 
 75. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power 
to . . . borrow Money on the credit of the United States . . . .”). 
 76. Perry, 294 U.S. at 353–54. 
 77. Id. at 354. 
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We regard it as confirmatory of a fundamental principle which applies as 
well to the government bonds in question, and to others duly authorized by 
the Congress, as to those issued before the amendment was adopted. Nor 
can we perceive any reason for not considering the expression ‘the validity 
of the public debt’ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the 
public obligations.78 
Yet the creditor victory in Perry came with an important twist, 
for the Court ruled that the “facts alleged by the” plaintiff bondholder 
“fail to show a cause of action for actual damages.”79 Wrote the 
majority: “Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in 
relation to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever.”80 The 
Court’s reasoning on this point hinged on the fact that because the 
federal government had shut down the gold market,81 the gold clauses 
in its debt were for all practical purposes inoperable.82  
Having shown no “actual damage,” the majority opinion went 
on to pronounce, the aggrieved bondholder had no action in the Court 
of Claims, for the Court of Claims had no power over actions for 
nominal damages.83 The “Delphic character” of the majority’s 
reasoning,84 together with post-oral argument press reports that in the 
event of a loss the government was prepared to push back hard against 
the Court,85 has fueled speculation that the outcome in Perry was 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 358.  
 80. Id. at 357. 
 81. See Dam, supra note 71, at 510. 
 82. See Georg Vanberg & Mitu Gulati, Financial Crises and Constitutional 
Compromise, in CONSTITUTIONS IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 117, 135 (Tom 
Ginsburg et al. eds., 2019); Dam, supra note 71, at 517. 
 83. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARV. 
L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1935); see also Unconstitutional Abrogation of Gold Clause in 
Government Bonds—Damages, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 444 (1935); John Harrison, 
New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal Constitution, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY (Elizabeth Garrett, et al. eds., 
2008). 
 84. Hart, supra note 83, at 1058. Observed Hart of the Court’s opinion in 
Perry: “Almost the only thing which it is possible to say with assurance is that the 
plaintiff in the particular suit did not recover.” Id. at 1059. See also Dam, supra note 
71, at 517 (“The reasoning [of the Court] on the lack of damages in Perry was 
convoluted and suspect . . . .”). 
 85. See, e.g., Gold Policy Decided by Roosevelt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1935 
(reporting that Roosevelt had decided “against restoration of the former gold value of 
the dollar, even if the Supreme Court should rule adversely to the government” and is 
“ready to put his hold on the people to the test if it becomes necessary”); Arthur Krock, 
Roosevelt Speech Was Ready in Case He Lost on Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1935. 
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driven by the Court’s anxieties about its institutional standing and 
legitimacy.86 
Critically, Justice Harlan Stone, who joined the majority 
opinion, distanced himself from the majority’s constitutional analysis 
in a concurring opinion that was narrow in scope.87 While agreeing 
that the plaintiff suffered “no damage because Congress, by the 
exercise of its power to regulate the currency, had made it impossible” 
for bondholders to “enjoy the benefits” of the promised gold 
payments,88 Justice Stone took pains to insist he did “not join in so 
much” of the majority opinion  
as may be taken to suggest that the exercise of the sovereign power to 
borrow money on credit, which does not override the sovereign immunity 
from suit, may nevertheless preclude or impede the exercise of another 
sovereign power, to regulate the value of money; or to suggest that, although 
there is and can be no present cause of action upon the repudiated gold 
clause, its obligation is nevertheless, in some manner and to some extent 
not stated, superior to the power to regulate the currency which we now 
hold to be superior to the obligation of the bonds.89  
Unsurprisingly, the gold clause abrogation provoked outrage, 
not least among the four dissenting Supreme Court Justices, who in an 
opinion by Justice McReynolds predicted “legal and moral chaos” 
would ensue.90 “Just men regard repudiation . . . of citizens by their 
sovereign with abhorrence,” thundered the dissent, adding for good 
measure that “we cannot believe the farseeing framers, who labored 
with hope of establishing justice and securing the blessings of liberty, 
intended that the expected government should have authority to 
annihilate its own obligations and destroy the very rights which they 
were endeavoring to protect.”91 
 
 86. See David Glick, Conditional Strategic Retreat: The Court’s Concession 
in the 1935 Gold Clause Cases, 71 J. POL. 800, 814 (2009) (suggesting that “the 
Administration extracted a crucial policy victory by appealing to the strategic instincts 
that the Court originally evinced in Marbury”); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold 
Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2012); see 
also Vanberg & Gulati, supra note 82, at 132 (suggesting that the Court’s conduct in 
Perry v. United States “illustrates the paradigm of a weak [C]ourt capitulating in the 
face of government pressure”). 
 87. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 358–61 (Stone, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 360. 
 89. Id. at 361. 
 90. Norman v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 361, 381 (1935) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 362; see also Justice McReynold’s Dissent in the Gold Clause 
Cases, 18 TENN. L. REV. 768, 768 (1945) (“It is impossible fully to estimate the result 
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But the grim consequences foretold by the “Four Horsemen” 
never came to pass.92 Although there were likely some adverse 
consequences for the United States,93 reneging on its contractual 
obligations did not cut off its access to capital. The U.S. government 
was able to issue new debt without serious obstacle.94 Indeed, some of 
the takers of the new debt were the very bondholders whose earlier 
debt had been involuntarily restructured.95 That the United States 
emerged in such good shape lends credence to the conclusion that on 
balance the United States government’s abrogation of the gold clauses 
in its debt did more good than harm in that the “benefits of eliminating 
debt overhang” exceeded the losses to creditors.96  
C. After the New Deal: The Growth of the Entitlements State  
A sharp rise in public debt during the Second World War was 
followed by a swift decline as more than a decade of pent-up consumer 
demand stoked a post-war economic boom. The next quarter century 
was a golden era for the U.S. economy, but as the 1960s came to an 
end, things began to look shaky. Inflation picked up speed, to the 
discomfiture of establishment economists, who had little to offer in 
the way of explanation, much less cure. And a change seemed to have 
come over an electorate that had long rejected significant budget 
deficits except in times of national crisis. With the new Medicare and 
Medicaid programs—established in 1965 as part of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society initiatives—and ramp-ups in other social 
spending, the United States was now borrowing not just for war and 
other exigent purposes but to fund ambitious social welfare and 
insurance programs with long time horizons.97 These spending 
 
of what has been done. The Constitution as many of us have understood it, the 
instrument that has meant so much to us, is gone.”). 
 92. The Article’s use of “Four Horsemen” refers to the three Justices who 
dissented alongside Justice McReynolds in the Gold Clause Cases. See id. at 768. 
 93. See Edwards et al., supra note 73, at 9 (summarizing evidence that some 
“investors may have turned to the highest-rated bonds issued by the strongest 
remaining sovereign borrowers” to the detriment of the United States). 
 94. See id. at 3 (finding that “controlling for key debt features” post-
restructuring debt auctions were “just as oversubscribed” as before). 
 95. See id. (concluding “there is little evidence that holders of restructured 
Treasury debt ‘voted with their feet’ by stigmatizing new debt issues”). 
 96. Kroszner, supra note 73, at 1. 
 97. See Daniel L. Thornton, The U.S. Deficit/Debt Problem: A Longer-Run 
Perspective, 94(6) FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 441, 445 (2012). 
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commitments, together with the absence of adequate taxes to pay for 
them, were a recipe for massive, ongoing deficits.  
In 1977, James Buchanan and Richard Wagner wrote a book that 
documented the demise of the classic view among America’s rulers 
that debt was generally bad and thus to be incurred only when 
necessary and paid off as soon as practicable.98 They attributed the 
collapse of this traditional understanding to the usefulness of 
Keynesian economic policy for politicians eager to spend public 
money to win favor with their constituents and other groups without a 
corresponding increase in taxes.99 Their forecast, which turned out to 
be right, was that public debt would rise inexorably unless something 
changed.100  
While compelling, Buchanan and Wagner’s thesis was not 
entirely persuasive. After all, Keynes’s insight that not all deficits did 
harm had been part of public discourse for decades. Why, then, did it 
take politicians so long to figure out its potential to allow them to 
appeal to various interests without presenting voters with the full tab? 
There was no question, however, that Buchanan and Wagner’s 
admonitions about the destruction that unchecked deficits could wreak 
were in tune with the worries of many voters. In 1980, the winner of 
the Presidential election was former California Governor Ronald 
Reagan, who on the campaign trail depicted budget deficits as a sign 
of government run amok.  
In his first inaugural address, Reagan promised a new era of 
fiscal rectitude.101 But what Reagan delivered—albeit with the 
assistance of a Democratic House of Representatives—were not 
balanced budgets but the largest deficits the United States had ever 
seen. These record deficits were in large part the consequence of tax 
 
 98. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: 
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977) (documenting the demise of the view 
among American rulers that debt was generally bad). 
 99. Id. at 166 (“Politicians themselves have, for the most part, short time 
horizons. For most of them, each election presents a critical point, and the primary 
problem they face is getting past this hurdle. ‘Tis better to run away today to be around 
to fight again another day’ might well be the motto. This is not to say that politicians 
never look beyond the next election in choosing courses of action, but only that such 
short-term considerations dominate the actions of most of them. Such features are, of 
course, an inherent and necessary attribute of a democracy.”). 
 100. See id. at 187–88 (recommending amending the United States 
Constitution to include a balanced budget amendment). 
 101. See Ronald W. Reagan, President, U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 
1981) (“For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our 
children’s future for the temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long 
trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals.”). 
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cuts aimed at lifting the economy out of a deep recession and increased 
defense spending justified as necessary to win the Cold War. 
Defenders of the Reagan legacy argue that while regrettable, the 
deficits made America stronger, richer, and safer. Whatever the 
deficits’ merits, Reagan paid no obvious political price. He was 
reelected by a landslide in 1984, following his “Morning in America” 
campaign that drew voters’ attention to the healthy economy and 
ignored the near doubling of the nation’s debt since 1979.102  
Deficits did decline enough during Reagan’s three final years in 
office to allow him to claim that the country was “on track” to balance 
its budget,103 but this claim turned out to be an example of his famous 
optimism at work. In fact, the deficit soared in George H.W. Bush’s 
first and only term as President, reaching $290 billion in 1992.104 The 
perils of government economic ineptitude loomed large in that year’s 
presidential contest, as maverick third-party candidate Ross Perot won 
19% of the popular vote with a campaign centered on the dangers of 
the “red ink of our national debt [and] the red tape of our government 
bureaucracy.”105  
Bill Clinton, the victor of the 1992 election, also ran on 
economic issues, emphasizing jobs and growth. At the start of his 
administration, there were indications that the Clinton presidency 
would feature heavy public investments in health and education. This 
did not happen. A strong belief that the market for United States 
 
 102. Debt and deficits were a great enough worry to spur Congress to pass the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, Pub. L. No.99-107, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), at the start of Ronald Reagan’s second 
term as President. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was billed as a vehicle to end the federal 
budget deficit by 1991. See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case 
of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 596 (1988). Whether this piece of 
innovative legislation would have achieved its ambitious goal must remain a matter 
of conjecture, for the Supreme Court invalidated the law the following year. See id. at 
597–98. A revised version of the law, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, lacked teeth and was regarded as having only 
minor effects. See id. at 598–99. 
 103. Ronald W. Reagan, President, U.S., Radio Address to the Nation on the 
Federal Budget and Executive Salaries (Jan. 7, 1989) (stating that the United States is 
on track to balancing the budget). Reagan was never at ease with the tide of red ink 
that is one of his legacies, and in his farewell address, he listed the budget deficit as 
one of his “regrets.” See Ronald W. Reagan, President, U.S., Farewell Address to the 
Nation (Jan. 11, 1989). 
 104. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A COMPARISON OF FISCAL YEAR 1992 
BUDGET ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL RESULTS 1 (1993). 
 105. Renee Loth, Perot Campaign Unveils New Ads, THE BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 8, 
1992, at 22 (reporting that one of Perot’s ads read: “In this new war, the enemy is not 
the red flag of communism but the red ink of our national debt”). 
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Treasury securities would demand higher yields if government 
spending rose precipitously,106 together with a resounding Republican 
victory in the 1994 midterm elections, pushed Clinton to the center on 
matters fiscal.  
In Clinton’s second term, as the economy flourished and the “dot 
com” boom crested, the federal budget actually ran a surplus for the 
four fiscal years 1998 to 2001. These surpluses had not been predicted, 
and their appearance allowed both Democrats (who held the 
Presidency) and Republicans (who controlled the House of 
Representatives) to claim the mantle of fiscal responsibility. But these 
“surpluses,” far from indicating that America’s governing class had 
repented of its spendthrift ways and embraced what Buchanan and 
Wagner called the “Old Time Fiscal Religion,”107 were phantoms of 
the United States government’s cash accounting practices.108 During 
these years of “surplus,” the national debt continued to grow.109 And 
as the 1990s wore on, the nation’s entitlements commitments looked 
increasingly unsustainable.110 
When Clinton left office in January 2001, total public debt was 
$5.73 trillion.111 Those figures now seem quaint. Since then, the 
federal government has broken new ground. Public debt reached $8.2 
trillion by the end of 2005, $10.7 trillion by the end of 2008, and as of 
September 30, 2019, approaches $23 trillion.112 These numbers are 
even more striking when viewed in relation to the size of the nation’s 
economy.113  
 
 106. See Ronald McKinnon, Where Are the Bond Vigilantes?, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424053111904332804576538363789127084 [https://perma.cc/LM5F-
FUQ5] (“During the Clinton administration, interest rates served to discipline 
government spending. That vital check is missing.”). 
 107. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 98, at 9. 
 108. See KLEINBARD, supra note 3, at 159 (“The budget of the United States is 
basically a cash flow statement . . . .”); see also Jason Delisle & Jason Richwine, The 
Case for Fair-Value Accounting, 21 NAT’L AFF. (2014). 
 109. See D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DEBT LIMIT: 
HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 13 (2015). 
 110. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? 147–50 (1997) (detailing 
the long-range problems the United States faced due to its entitlements programs); see 
also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 1 (Dec. 
14, 1999). 
 111. Debt to the Penny, supra note 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2019 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, 
supra note 4. 
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How did America’s debt climb so high so fast? Among the 
causes most often invoked are the Bush Tax Cuts of 2001 and 2003, 
their extension in 2010 and further partial extension in 2012; Medicare 
Part D, a large new prescription drug entitlement with no identified 
funding source;114 about $1 trillion for homeland security;115 the 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by over a decade of 
protracted conflict and expensive rebuilding;116 the close to one trillion 
dollar Stimulus program enacted in early 2009;117 the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act passed in 2010;118 and the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.119 All these measures—or at least aspects 
of them—can be defended on grounds of national security, public 
welfare, and so forth. But it is hard to make the case that, taken as a 
whole, they add up to sustainable fiscal policy.  
D. Where We Are Now 
The official debt is but the tip of the iceberg when it comes to 
what American citizens and residents—not to mention the rest of the 
world—have been led to expect from the United States government.120 
Most salient are the “quasi-constitutional” old-age Social Security 
benefits that are the primary means of support for elderly individuals 
 
 114. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 419–20 (2005). 
 115. See generally TOM COBURN, A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S MISSIONS AND PERFORMANCE (2015) (estimating the 
Department of Homeland Security’s various funding awards). 
 116. See generally SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN 
RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR), QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
(2014) (outlining government expenditures on Afghan economic development); 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR), LEARNING FROM 
IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT (2013) (outlining government expenditures on Iraqi economic 
development). 
 117. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 504, 
123 Stat. 115 (2009); see also MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE NEW DEAL: THE HIDDEN 
STORY OF CHANGE IN THE OBAMA ERA (2013). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 119. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 120. See James D. Hamilton, Off-Balance-Sheet Federal Liabilities 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19253, 2013); see also Howell E. Jackson, 
Counting the Ways: The Structure of Federal Spending, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY, supra note 83, at 185, 188; Julia 
D. Mahoney, America’s Exceptional Safety Net, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 38 
(2017). 
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in the bottom half of the income distribution.121 Many Americans plan 
to draw on these benefits heavily in retirement.122 It is true that a 
portion of expected future Social Security outlays are funded in the 
sense that a special class of Treasury debt has been put aside for 
them,123 but these holdings fall far short of the actuarially expected 
outlay, meaning that Social Security is significantly underfunded.124  
Also looming large are the U.S. government’s promises to cover 
retiree health care needs, largely through its Medicare program. As 
with Social Security benefits, beneficiaries’ expectations have a moral 
component because of the common belief that through dedicated taxes 
collected over their working lives they have already paid for what they 
will receive.125 Other big ticket items include the federal government’s 
share of Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), two means-tested programs that are linchpins of the nation’s 
social safety net, and approximately $8 trillion of obligations for 
pension and retiree health care benefits of federal government 
employees, both military and civilian.126  
No discussion of United States government finances is complete 
without mentioning its role as insurer. Some of these commitments, 
 
 121. See James M. Poterba, Retirement Security in an Aging Society 44 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19930, 2014) (detailing “[t]he 
importance of Social Security for those in the lower income range” and concluding 
that “changes in the benefits associated with this program, for this group, would be 
likely to translate directly into living standards”); see also David N. Weil, Capital and 
Wealth in the 21st Century 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20919, 2015); Dirk Cotton, Are Social Security Benefits a Bond?, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://seekingalpha.com/article/2666875-are-social-security-
benefits-a-bond [https://perma.cc/N78R-D7CV] (estimating that “for most American 
households, the present value of Social Security benefits is the largest component of 
the household’s wealth, followed by home equity and then retirement savings”). 
 122. See Frank Newport, Young, Old in US Plan on Relying More on Social 
Security, GALLUP.ORG (May 25, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/211085/ 
nonretirees-rely-social-security.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EFC-2SPQ] (reporting that 
since the start of this century “non-retired Americans have become somewhat more 
likely to say Social Security will be a ‘major source’ of income in their retirement”). 
 123. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 124. See BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. 
DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2019) (“Social Security’s combined 
trust funds are projected to cover full payment of scheduled benefits on a timely basis 
until the trust fund reserves become depleted in 2035.”). 
 125. Medicare, like Social Security, does have “trust funds” of sorts, but the 
most recent trustees report projects that these funds will be depleted a little more than 
a decade from now. See BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY 
MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2019). 
 126. U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 4, at 19, 99–108. 
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including the deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on roughly $7 trillion entrusted to 
financial institutions, are explicit obligations about which extensive 
public information is available.127 Others can only be guessed at, 
including potentially hundreds of billions of dollars of backstops for 
private pensions.128 In addition, many state and local governments face 
serious financial challenges, including huge pension funding 
shortfalls, stagnant revenues, and excessive debt loads,129 and it is at 
least plausible that the federal government will end up assisting some 
of these entities.130 Certain private firms may also enjoy implicit 
federal government backstops, as evidenced by the bailouts of the 
2007–2009 financial crisis.131 
Finally, the United States government has taken on the mantle 
of guarantor of world security and stability as well as its own national 
defense.132 How much longer the United States will be able to fulfill 
 
 127. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-295R, FINANCIAL AUDIT: 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION FUNDS’ 2018 AND 2017 FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS (2019). 
 128. See Alex Pollak, Multi-Employer Pension Bailout Needs a Good 
Bank/Bad Bank Strategy, REAL CLEAR MKTS. (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2019/07/10/multi-
employer_pension_bailout_needs_a_good_bankbad_bank_strategy_103812.html 
[https://perma.cc/K7ZU-6LZ3] (reporting that “many multi-employer, union-
sponsored pension plans are hopelessly insolvent,” the “government’s program that 
guarantees those pensions through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC)” has a “net worth of a negative $54 billion,” and that “PBGC estimates the 
total unfunded pension liabilities of the multi-employer plans at $638 billion”). 
 129. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy, 
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 818 (2019) (“Cities and towns across the country face debt 
burdens of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression.”); David A. Skeel, Is 
Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1064 
(2013). 
 130. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 154 (2012) 
(observing that “[t]he New Deal and, on a grander scale, the Great Society blanketed 
vast areas of government with ‘cooperative’ fiscal transfer programs” and that in 
“recent experience, the long-standing precommitment against federal bailouts of state 
and local governments appears to have collapsed”). 
 131. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE 
FUTURE OF BAILOUTS 2–3 (2018) (arguing that government bailouts of systemically 
important private firms are unavoidable in a complex economic system); Adam J. 
Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437, 439 (2011); Carmen M. 
Reinhart et al., Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes Since 1800, 26 
J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71–72 (2012) (describing how “the lines between public and 
private debt often become blurred in a crisis”). 
 132. See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, 
CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER (2012) (detailing the 
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this mission is an open question, but for now it is committed to 
maintaining and, if necessary, deploying a large and very expensive 
fighting force around the globe.133  
To be sure, the United States government has considerable assets 
as well as liabilities.134 These assets include roughly 640 million acres 
of land in the United States along with numerous structures affixed to 
those lands (such as dams, power plants, and space exploration 
facilities),135 a U.S. government gold reserve,136 and extensive carbon 
and other energy resources.137 Also included in the “assets” of the 
United States are trillions of dollars of loan receivables of highly 
uncertain value,138 most notably the federal government’s troubled 
$1.4 trillion student loan portfolio.139 
Sales or leases of some of these assets could provide relief from 
financial pressures for the United States, both in the short- and long-
terms.140 But the fact that the United States has substantial assets does 
not mean it cannot be in serious financial trouble. Even if the total 
value of the nation’s assets dwarfs that of its liabilities—which there 
is grave reason to doubt, in no small part because the federal 
government’s own 2018 balance sheet shows a negative net worth of 
 
United States’ endeavor to provide global economic services and security); STEPHEN 
M. WALT, THE HELL OF GOOD INTENTIONS: AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY ELITES AND 
THE DECLINE OF U.S. PRIMACY (2018) (examining the United States’ post-Cold War 
attempt to spread democratic and capitalist values globally). 
 133. See DANIEL EGEL ET AL., ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF OVERSEAS SECURITY 
COMMITMENTS 1 (2016). 
 134. See U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 4, at 4, 18 (2018). 
 135. See id. at 33. 
 136. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, STATUS REPORT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT 
GOLD RESERVE (2019) (showing that as of November 30, 2019, the United States 
government’s gold reserve totaled 261.5 million troy ounces). 
 137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-410, FEDERAL OIL 
AND GAS ROYALTIES: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD IMPROVE ONRR’S ABILITY TO 
ASSESS ITS ROYALTY COLLECTION EFFORTS 5 (2019). 
 138. Michael Grunwald, The (Real) Bank of America, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/federal-loans-bank-of-america-
113920_full.html [https://perma.cc/9BS8-A99W] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) 
(describing a “bizarre” portfolio of government-held loans that “sprawl across 30 
agencies at a dozen Cabinet departments, with no one responsible for managing” the 
portfolio, “evaluating its performance or [managing] its risks”). 
 139. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A SNAPSHOT OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN 
DEBT (Feb. 4, 2019). 
 140. See Jim Millstein, Burning the Furniture to Heat the House—The 
Potential Role of Asset Sales in Funding the Federal Government’s Deficits, in IS U.S. 
GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 151–52. 
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approximately $21.52 trillion141—many assets cannot be disposed of 
without endangering national security or significantly eroding the 
government’s capacity to govern.  
II. BEYOND TAX AND SPENDING REFORM: EXPANDING THE MENU 
So far, the precipitous rise in United States government 
commitments has not led to a concomitant expansion in the set of 
options under consideration to deal with the situation. No matter how 
high the debt climbs or how massive the growth in entitlements, 
debates about what to do continue to revolve around tax increases and 
spending cuts, as well as to assume that all public debt obligations will 
be met.142 In our judgment, to so limit the discussion is a mistake. 
There is no reason to regard debt restructuring as a sort of third rail, 
the merest contact with which must prove fatal to the nation. On the 
contrary, debt restructuring is a real possibility, if only because the 
electorate may favor receiving promised government benefits over 
repaying creditors. To add debt restructuring to the mix of options, in 
short, is not to court disaster but to accept reality.  
A. Why Worry? Capital Markets Love the United States and It 
Borrows in Its Own Currency  
A common rejoinder to alarm over the United States 
government’s financial state is that there is no cause for fear right 
now.143 After all, or so the argument goes, the United States borrows 
trillions of dollars each year at very low interest rates, definitive proof 
that the world’s capital markets do not think it is in any trouble.144 
Given the eagerness of domestic and foreign creditors to lend the 
 
 141. See U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 4, at 59 
 142. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Who’s Afraid of the Budget Deficit?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/opinion/house-democrats-
budget-deficit.html [https://perma.cc/VK4P-26LN] (arguing that “[d]eficit obsession 
was deeply destructive in the years that followed the global financial crisis” and that 
“there are things the government should be spending money on” at present, “like 
fixing our deteriorating infrastructure and helping children get education, health care 
and adequate nutrition”).  
 144. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, WHITE HOUSE BURNING: THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS, OUR NATIONAL DEBT AND WHY IT MATTERS TO YOU 7 (2012) 
(“The United States is the world’s only true superpower . . . and its national survival 
is not in question. Nor does [its] Treasury have any trouble borrowing 
money. . . . Treasury bonds are used in financial markets as the very definition of a 
safe asset.”).  
1310 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
United States money at very low interest rates, why fret now?145 Fiscal 
restraint is a problem for the future.146 
We disagree with this sentiment. The history of sovereign debt 
is replete with stories of nations that borrowed freely until suddenly 
they could not.147 High profile recent examples include Greece, which 
in 2009 lost access to the financial markets following revelations it 
had been misstating its budget deficit figures for years,148 and 
Argentina, which after being shut out of the financial markets in 2001 
proceeded to engage in the largest sovereign debt default in history.149 
The blunt truth is that “it is hard to know how much debt any 
government can safely issue before risk premiums start rising in a 
dangerous manner.”150  
In the normal equilibrium, holders of short-term debts backed by 
illiquid but valuable assets expect to be repaid on demand and 
accordingly do not all demand to be repaid at once. Under such 
conditions, investors are generally content to roll over maturing debt. 
But, as many financial institutions discovered to their peril during the 
2007–2008 financial crisis, the equilibrium can shift rapidly if 
 
 145. See, e.g., Stephanie Kelton, How We Think About the Deficit Is Mostly 
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/ 
opinion/deficit-tax-cuts-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7YXA-8BRU] (arguing that 
“Americans are vulnerable to nationalist scare tactics that warn of the perils of relying 
on foreigners to pay our bills” while the “truth” is that there is “no reason to worry 
about China (or any other entity) refusing to finance our deficits”); see also Olivier 
Blanchard, Public Debt and Low Interest Rates, 109(4) AM. ECON. REV. 1197, 1198 
(2019) (concluding that “the signal sent by low rates” on United States government 
bonds “is not only that debt may not have a substantial fiscal cost, but also that it may 
have limited welfare costs”). 
 146. Cf. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem 
of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 759 (2002) (examining how current generations 
can create problems for future generations in the context of land preservation).  
 147. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 73, at 174; Carmen Reinhart & 
Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath, 14 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
215, 216 (2016). 
 148. See Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-
euro.html [https://perma.cc/KXC2-7MGY].  
 149. See PIERRE VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL: U.S. PROSECUTIONS AND 
THE REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (forthcoming March 2020); Eshe Nelson, 
How Argentina Went from Selling 100 Year Bonds to an IMF Rescue in a Matter of 
Months, QUARTZ (May 12, 2018), https://qz.com/1274875/how-argentina-went-from-
selling-100-year-bonds-to-an-imf-rescue-in-a-matter-of-months/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z2C8-ZXVQ].  
 150. Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Forty Years of Leverage: What Have We 
Learned About Sovereign Debt?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 266, 268 (2014).  
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expectations change.151 When trouble materializes for debtor nations, 
it tends to follow a pattern: the unlucky country is heavily indebted 
but has no current problems borrowing money, until suddenly and 
without significant warning, it does.152 This point is a crucial one, for 
what at first blush appear to be temporary glitches in access to credit 
can quickly snowball into solvency threats.153  
“Rollover risk” is a serious worry.154 Although the U.S. 
government issues debt with a range of maturities, it relies heavily on 
short-term instruments with maturities under ten years. Because short-
term interest rates are generally less than long-term rates, relying on 
short-term debt can reduce interest cost. But there is no free lunch: this 
strategy increases the risk that at any one point in time the government 
will be unable to sell enough bills to pay off the maturing bills and 
thus be thrown into default.155 Alternatively, lenders might demand 
such a high nominal interest rate as to guarantee that interest payments 
and other spending commitments (including entitlements payments) 
could not both be honored. At present, over 65% of the federal 
government’s annual cash outflows are rollovers of maturing debt 
with the proceeds of newly-issued debt.156 Deprive the U.S. 
 
 151. See MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 103 (2016). 
 152. See Nina Karnaukh et al., The Dark Side of Foreign Exchange Liquidity, 
VOX (Sept. 10, 2015), https://voxeu.org/article/dark-side-foreign-exchange-liquidity 
[https://perma.cc/P96X-TGE5] (noting that nominal domestic-currency interest rates 
shot up nearly overnight during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the “Black 
Wednesday” crisis of 1992). 
 153. See Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, Rollover Risk and Credit Risk, 67(2) J. FIN. 
391, 392–93, 397–98, 401–02 (2012). 
 154. See Peter R. Fisher, Thoughts on Debt Sustainability, in IS U.S. 
GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 87, 99 (“If you ask Treasury or 
finance ministry officials responsible for debt management ‘What keeps you up at 
night?’ the only candid reply will be: the risk of not being able to rollover their debt 
at the next auction. . . . [D]ebt sustainability is about rollover risk: the risk that 
demand at an auction will drop precipitously from recent, prior auctions.”). 
 155. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2014).  
 156. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY DAILY STATEMENT tbl.2 
(2019). The following numbers are from the Treasury Daily Statement (“TDS”) of 
September 30, 2019, the end of the U.S. 2019 fiscal year. During the fiscal year 2019, 
ending September 30, 2019, the Federal Government had cash receipts of $15.99 
trillion (TDS Table II, Total Deposits). Id. Of this amount, $11.92 trillion (TDS Table 
II Public Debt Cash issues from Table III-B) or 75% came from borrowing and $4.07 
trillion (TDS Table II, Total Deposits Minus Debt Deposits) or 25% came from taxes 
and other revenue sources. Id. During the fiscal year 2019, the Federal Government 
had cash expenditures of $15.99 trillion (TDS Table II, Total Withdrawals), of which 
$10.96 trillion or 69% was for redemption of outstanding debt (Public Debt Cash 
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government of the latter, and it could not possibly pay the former and 
still have enough left over to pay Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid benefits, let alone the remainder of its budgeted 
expenditures.  
Of course, America’s status as the safest refuge for capital may 
ensure uninterrupted access to whatever funds are desired for the 
indefinite future. But although it is true that in times of trouble 
investors have often fled to the relative safety of United States treasury 
securities, there is no guarantee they will view these instruments as 
safe no matter how large the amount of outstanding debt and no matter 
how frequently it has to be refunded.157 The U.S. Treasury market has 
been hailed a “marvel of modern finance,”158 but it is not a marvel 
without limits. In addition, the United States could lose its vaunted 
position as the safest refuge for capital not by its own reckless conduct 
but through effective competition from rivals who seek to displace it. 
And in thinking about how things could go wrong for the United 
States, it is also worth noting that a significant amount of the debt held 
by the public is owned by what the Department of the Treasury 
 
Redemption from Table III-B), and $5.03 trillion (TDS Table II, Total Withdrawals 
Minus Public Debt Redemption Withdrawals) or 31% was for the other expenses of 
the government. Id. As of September 30, 2019, the total debt of the U.S. government 
was $22.72 trillion. Id. at tbl.3(C). Treasury Daily Statements both current and 
archived back to January 7, 1998, are available online. BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., 
https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov [https://perma.cc/CFX5-P6B6] (last visited Feb. 3, 
2020) (supplying Treasury Daily Statements both current and archived back to 
January 7, 1998). Earlier Treasury Daily Statements are available in print. The 
Treasury Daily Statement implements the mandate of the United States Constitution 
that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public 
Money shall be published from time to time.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Treasury 
Daily Statement is one of the longstanding practices of the Department of the Treasury 
that implements a policy of financial transparency and has helped to support financial 
market demand for United States debt instruments.  
 157. See Francis Warnock, How Dangerous Is U.S. Government Debt?, 2 CAP. 
FLOWS Q. 1, 1 (2010) (“The dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency has become 
a facet of U.S. power, allowing the United States to borrow effortlessly and sustain 
large debt-financed military commitments. Capital has tended to flood into the United 
States especially readily during moments of geopolitical stress, ensuring that the 
nation has had the financial wherewithal to conduct an assertive foreign policy 
precisely at moments when crises demanded it. But the capital inflows associated with 
the dollar’s reserve-currency status have created a vulnerability, too, opening the door 
to a foreign sell-off of U.S. securities that could drive up U.S. interest rates and render 
the nation’s formidable stock of debt far more expensive to service.”).  
 158. KENNETH D. GARBADE, BIRTH OF A MARKET: THE U.S. TREASURY 
SECURITIES MARKET FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1 (2012).   
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classifies as “foreign holders.”159 It is possible some could reduce their 
holdings or even stop buying altogether for strategic reasons.160  
One response is to say that because Treasury debt is 
denominated in U.S. dollars, which the Federal Reserve can create in 
unlimited amounts, the United States will never have to default. 
Creditors will always expect repayment, and there will accordingly 
never be a run on Treasury debt. The same logic suggests that the 
substantial Treasury debt held by the Fed is not a true debt: if it is not 
repaid, the Fed can meet its obligations to the rest of the banking 
system by creating currency. This line of reasoning was most 
famously articulated by now President Donald J. Trump during his 
2016 presidential campaign, when he clarified an earlier statement 
widely interpreted as indicating that he believed debt default was an 
option for the United States.161 Said Trump: “This is the United States 
government. First of all, you never have to default because you print 
the money. . . . So there’s never a default.”162  
As a formal matter this is true, but as a practical matter the 
difference between formal default and rampant inflation is merely 
 
 159. Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY (Nov. 18, 2019), https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt 
[https://perma.cc/D7VN-PDRH] (explaining that the largest concentrations of these 
securities are in the hands of China and Japan, each of which holds roughly $1.1 
trillion worth, and that among other “foreign holders” with substantial amount of 
federal debt are Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Ireland). 
 160. See Warnock, supra note 157, at 1, 6.  
 161. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Trump’s Idea to Cut National Debt: Get 
Creditors to Accept Less, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1Trr97k 
[https://perma.cc/637X-CXJW]. 
 162. Nick Gass, Trump: U.S. Can Never Default Because It Prints Money, 
POLITICO (May 9, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/trump-no-debt-
default-222957 [https://perma.cc/QLR5-J8EH]; see also John Carney, Trump Says the 
U.S. Will Never Have to Default Because It Prints the Money, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 
2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/05/09/donald-trump-says-the-u-s-will-
never-default-because-it-prints-the-money/ [https://perma.cc/P27P-CNZ5]. This 
statement was not Trump’s final word on the subject. In a television appearance the 
following month, Trump remarked that as President, were the U.S. economy to crash, 
he would negotiate with the nation’s creditors: “[Y]ou go back and you say, ‘hey, 
guess what? The economy just crashed. I’m going to give you back half.’” See 
“Trump recession”? Presumptive GOP Nominee Fires Back at Clinton, CBS NEWS 
(June 22, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/2016-race-donald-trump-responds-
to-hillary-clintons-attack-on-his-economic-proposals [https://perma.cc/GJY4-
3QYK]; see also Russell Berman, Donald Trump Brings Back the Talk of Default, 
ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/ 
donald-trump-brings-back-the-default-talk/488270/ [https://perma.cc/7TY9-Y6ER] 
(characterizing Trump’s statements in the CBS News This Morning interview as 
“much more of a musing than an actual plan”).  
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semantic. Take the extreme case in which the Federal Reserve prints 
so much money that a dollar is worth next to nothing. Paying debts in 
worthless computer entries is default in all but form. Moreover, the 
strategy could have consequences even more dire than those of a 
formal default. It would destroy confidence not merely in Treasury 
debt, but in the dollar. It is even possible that lenders will begin 
treating the United States as they do some other profligate nations and 
refuse to lend us money in our own domestic currency. Less severe 
inflation poses less severe problems, but also does not retire debt as 
effectively.  
All in all, the short-term gain of retiring debt with newly created 
dollars could be more than offset by long-term economic harm. While 
the U.S. central bank can create as many dollars as it wishes, it cannot 
obligate the markets to continue to supply the same amount of goods 
and services in return for those dollars. Voters might well react 
negatively to policies that carry substantial risks of significant 
inflation, for inflation can entail tremendous social costs, including 
misallocations of resources, tax distortions, and arbitrary wealth 
redistributions.163 When and under what circumstances voters would 
prefer inflation to debt restructuring is of course a matter of conjecture. 
But there is no reason to think that citizens will always see inflation as 
the lesser evil.  
B. Why Debt Restructuring Belongs On the Table 
Another perspective on the federal government’s finances holds 
that while the nation is in serious danger of “macroeconomic carnage” 
and “catastrophic budget failure” as it continues to rack up large 
debts,164 crisis can (and should) be averted through the traditional, 
familiar policy prescriptions of tax reform and adjustments to 
government expenditures.165 This conviction lies at the core of a 
 
 163. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 640–46 (8th ed. 
2016).  
 164. Burman et al., supra note 3, at 562 (concluding that the “tax and spending 
trajectories” contained in a then-recent Congressional Budget Office report could lead 
to “macroeconomic carnage” so grisly as to merit the label “catastrophic budget 
failure”).  
 165. See id. at 581 (arguing that the solution for avoiding economic meltdown 
is “relatively straightforward: cut spending, especially for entitlements, and raise 
revenues to stabilize and eventually reduce debt as a share of the economy”).  
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number of well-wrought proposals crafted by respected experts over 
the past decade or so.166  
Yet for all their virtues, these proposals have two things in 
common. First, none have been adopted, and there is no indication that 
any of these or similar policies has any significant chance of being put 
into operation any time soon. And second, all are grounded in an 
undefended and, in our judgment, indefensible assumption that 
principal and interest payments on treasury securities must always 
take precedence over all other United States government 
commitments.  
We are deeply skeptical of the notion that debtholders enjoy de 
facto and de jure absolute priority over all other potential claimants. 
While it is true that conventional wisdom has long held that social 
security and other entitlements promises do not bind the federal 
government with the same force as does its formal debt, legal authority 
on this point is scant.167 Perhaps more important, the wealth 
represented by social security and other strong, well-settled 
expectations of government transfers is vast and the number of 
Americans who rely on the payment streams from that wealth is very 
large.168 Voters consider, and for decades have been encouraged by 
politicians to consider, Social Security, Medicare, and other 
entitlements as a form of household wealth as dependable and secure 
as a savings account. For that reason, one can easily envision holders 
of United States government debt losing a political showdown with 
entitlements claimants. This is particularly so if the United States were 
to consider a restructuring plan that discriminates between domestic 
and foreign holders of its debt. Early twenty-first century voters might 
not feel a sense of moral obligation to the nation’s creditors, 
particularly foreign ones. 
Nor does the United States Constitution compel the federal 
government to put its “formal debt” creditors first, whatever the cost 
 
 166. See, e.g., BOWLES & SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 8–9; PETE DOMINICI & 
ALICE RIVLIN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., DOMENICI-RIVLIN DEBT REDUCTION TASK 
FORCE PLAN 2.0 (2011).  
 167. See John Harrison, New Property, Entrenchment, and the Fiscal 
Constitution, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET 
POLICY, supra note 83, at 401, 401–03.  
 168. See Weil, supra note 121, at 18 (describing how in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries “new types of wealth,” including “transfer wealth, have 
come to constitute a very significant fraction of wealth”); see also EDWARD N. WOLFF, 
A CENTURY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 311–66 (2017) (calculating the magnitude and 
distribution of the wealth represented by expectations of social security benefits).  
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to the nation.169 That is not to say that any and all measures carried out 
under the banner of debt restructuring are sure to pass constitutional 
muster. Far from it, for protections for private property and contract 
rights are key components of the American constitutional system,170 
and were of great importance to the founding generation.171 But the 
relationship between private rights and public values is a complex 
one.172 Federal, state, and local governments continually exercise 
power in ways that have profound effects on the value and character 
of property and contract rights. Not surprisingly, questions of where 
the boundary lies between permissible and impermissible government 
actions justified as furthering the public interest are often very difficult 
ones.173  
Nothing in the Constitution as originally ratified forbids debt 
restructuring. Indeed, the historical record shows that delegates to the 
1787 Philadelphia Convention considered including language 
explicitly precluding federal government debt defaults but chose not 
to do so.174 And while the Fifth Amendment—added to the 
Constitution in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights175—provides in 
 
 169. Cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Overcoming Sovereign 
Immunity: Causes of Action for Enforcing the Constitution, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION 165, 184 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton 
eds., 2018) (tracing the history of government immunity from suits by private parties, 
and observing that “sovereign immunity doctrine has retained its core treasury-
protective function, with its continuing prohibitions on suits for collection of 
sovereign debt and for retrospective monetary relief that runs against the state 
treasury”). 
 170. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 303–80 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, 
Property in the United States Constitution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, at 501, 501–20; James Y. Stern, Property’s 
Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2013).  
 171. See Renee Lettow Lerner, Enlightenment Economics and the Framing of 
the U.S. Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 40 (2012) (noting that the 
inclusion of the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause in the Constitution provides 
“evidence of the importance to the Framers of upholding contracts and protecting 
private property from government interference”).  
 172. See David Singh Grewal, The Legal Constitution of Capitalism, in AFTER 
PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 471, 484–85 (Heather 
Boushey et al. eds., 2017); David Blankfein-Tabachnik & Kevin A. Kordana, Kaplow 
and Shavell and the Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 
(2017).   
 173. See Kelo’s Legacy, supra note 8; Stern, supra note 170. 
 174. See McConnell, supra note 40, at 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 175. See NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, 
PARTISAN, PRESIDENT 245–85 (2017); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE ANNOTATED U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 232–34 (2009). 
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pertinent part that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation,”176 there is no 
indication this language was intended to have or understood as having 
any bearing on the federal government’s capacity to carry out debt 
restructuring activities.177  
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, added to the Constitution in 
the wake of the Civil War, it is true that some interpret the text of the 
Amendment’s Public Debt Clause as a blanket prohibition on the 
federal government’s failing to make its debt payments.178 But even 
some experts sympathetic to such an interpretation admit there are 
other plausible readings of the Public Debt Clause.179 Critically, that 
interpretation of the apposite language is not the most logical one. The 
Public Debt Clause provides that the “validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payments of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned,”180 but failing to pay 
a debt in full and on time is not at all the same thing as questioning 
that debt’s validity. Adjustment and even full discharge of debt 
obligations is part and parcel of a sophisticated commercial society,181 
and debtors can (and frequently do) seek adjustments or discharges 
without claiming the debt at issue is in any way not valid. This occurs 
with regularity in the area of international sovereign debt 
restructuring, where nations that seek to renegotiate their obligations 
generally do not deny that the debt was lawfully incurred.182  
 
 176. U.S. CONST. amend. V.      
 177. See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth…Please! The Original Insignificance 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 643 
(2017); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408, 420–21 (2010).  
 178. See, e.g., Michael B. Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and 
the Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Public Debt Clause 5 (Geo. Wash. Univ. Legal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 575, 2011) (advocating a broad reading of the Public Debt Clause and arguing 
that “[t]he most obvious consequence of taking the Clause seriously would be that a 
government failure to make debt payments . . . would be unconstitutional”). 
 179. See, e.g., Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 6, at 1191–92 (detailing 
alternative and narrower readings).  
 180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.  
 181. See DOUGLAS BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 32 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 6th ed. 2014); Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Inequality and Equity in 
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 875, 875 (2018). 
 182. See ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, 
REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN FINANCE 1 (2014); VERDIER, supra note 
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Turning to judicial precedent, the leading United States Supreme 
Court case—in fact, the only case—on federal government debt 
restructuring is Perry v. United States.183 While it is possible to argue 
Perry stands for the proposition that the Constitution prevents the 
federal government from restructuring its debt in any way,184 that is a 
heavy burden to place on an eighty-four-year-old, highly cryptic 
opinion for a bare majority of the Supreme Court, particularly when 
one of the five-man majority indicated in a concurring opinion he did 
not embrace the majority’s constitutional analysis.185 Perhaps more 
importantly, the denouement of Perry—when the Court found the 
complaining debtholder had suffered no damage and thus sidestepped 
a potential confrontation with Congress and the Executive branch—
belies the notion that the Constitution must necessarily operate as a 
hard constraint.  
Again, we do not argue the Constitution is silent or irrelevant 
when it comes to restructurings of federal government debt. On the 
contrary, we believe the Constitution and constitutional doctrine 
would be of the utmost importance in determining whether and to what 
extent specific debt restructuring proposals are lawful. Our claim is 
that the common assertion that debt restructuring is somehow off the 
table because it is inimical to the American constitutional system is 
not well-grounded in constitutional text, history, structure, or 
precedent.  
III. PREPARING TO RESTRUCTURE 
If only for planning purposes, it is prudent to recognize that the 
United States may fall far short of its commitments. Should that time 
come, the United States will need to overhaul its formal debt, its social 
insurance and welfare programs, or both. For the system to work up to 
its potential, however, it needs adequate preparation. The panicked 
official responses to the events of 2007–2009,186 which came on the 
 
149. Rare exceptions to this practice occur when successor regimes claim debt 
incurred by predecessor regimes is “odious” and thus not binding on a nation. See G. 
Mitu Gulati et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203 (2007). 
 183. See supra Part I.B. 
 184. See, e.g., Josh Hazan, Unconstitutional Debt Ceilings, 103 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 29, 29 (2014); Zachary K. Ostro, In Debt We Trust: The Unconstitutionality 
of Defaulting on American Financial Obligations, and the Political Implications of 
Their Perpetual Validity, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 241, 241 (2014).   
 185. See supra at notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 186. See generally BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A 
CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (2015) (documenting the experience of the 2008 financial 
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heels of years of denying that so serious a financial crisis could 
occur,187 illustrate the virtues of thinking ahead. So do the examples of 
the 2011 and 2013 showdowns over the debt ceiling in which—or so 
the then incumbent Secretaries of the Treasury claimed—the United 
States teetered on the brink of catastrophe.188  
To date, there is no sign that federal government officials have 
any appetite for thinking seriously about restructuring as an option.189 
Their failure to do so is readily explainable: to contemplate default 
would be to admit tacitly that United States debt securities are not in 
fact risk-free. This admission would be an awkward one, given that 
“large swaths” of the nation’s—and the world’s—financial 
infrastructure are built on the idea that obligations of the United States 
government carry no risk.190 But this continual refusal to face reality 
may exact a heavy cost. A financial system not grounded in the 
delusion that U.S government debt carries no default risk could be a 
more stable one.  
We believe academics have a useful role to play in deliberations 
about conflicts between private rights and public exigencies, as they 
are subject to fewer constraints than most political and government 
 
crisis from the perspective of the chairman of the Federal Reserve); HENRY A. 
PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2010) (cataloguing the events of the 2008 financial crisis). 
 187. See Julia D. Mahoney, Takings, Legitimacy, and Emergency Action: 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 301–02 
(2016).  
 188. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Testimony of Secretary 
Lew Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Debt Limit (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file 
with the author) (warning of “potentially catastrophic impacts of default, including 
credit market disruptions, a significant loss in the value of the dollar, markedly 
elevated U.S. interest rates, negative spillover effects to the global economy, and real 
risk of a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse”); 
Timothy F. Geithner, Meet the Press Transcript for July 10, 2011, NBC NEWS (July 
10, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43672884/ns/meet_the_press-
transcripts/t/meet-press-transcript-july/ [https://perma.cc/2CTK-BAT8].  
 189. See Mooney, supra note 1, at 3 (“[I]t is possible that behind closed doors 
at the Department of the Treasury and within the Federal Reserve System (Fed) the 
relevant issues have been pondered and analyzed in depth. . . . But I suspect that no 
such investigations have taken place. The statements and behavior of Treasury and 
the Fed during the period of 2007 to 2009 appear to reflect a classic case of denial. 
Exploring a U.S. default or restructuring would be very much out of their institutional 
character.”). 
 190. Donald B. Marron, Inst. Fellow & Dir. of Econ. Policy Initiatives, The 
Urban Inst., The Costs of Debt Limit Brinksmanship: Testimony Before the Joint 
Economic Committee (Sept. 18, 2013) (detailing the “unique and vital role” Treasury 
securities play in financial markets).  
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actors in terms of what they can say in public about the nation’s 
finances.191 In that spirit, we turn to how the United States can get into 
better shape to weather economic and financial storms.  
A. The Short Term: Reducing the Risk of a Rollover Crisis  
To enhance the capacity of the United States to respond to 
shocks with calm and dispatch, we suggest that the federal government 
take two steps. The first is to increase the duration of the outstanding 
debt, preferably through the issuance of perpetual instruments, thus 
reducing the amount of debt that has to be continuously rolled over 
and mitigating the immediate effect of higher interest rates. The 
second is to set up a liquidity fund to be available in the event of a 
financial disruption, thus giving the government breathing room to 
fund its operations for a period of time without resorting to the debt 
markets. 
1. Extension of Debt Duration 
The first of our suggestions is to extend the duration of the 
outstanding debt.192 Extending the duration would reduce the daily 
 
 191. Cf. Howell E. Jackson, The 2011 Debt Ceiling Impasse Revisited, in IS 
U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 55, 67.  
 192. A discussion of the optimal duration of United States Treasury debt can 
be found in THE $13 TRILLION QUESTION: HOW AMERICA MANAGES ITS DEBT (David 
Wessel ed., 2016) [hereinafter THE $13 TRILLION QUESTION]. THE $13 TRILLION 
QUESTION features two papers addressing optimal debt duration. One, by Robin 
Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Joshua S. Rudolph, and Lawrence H. Summers, 
argues for a shorter duration. See Greenwood et al., The Optimal Maturity of 
Government Debt, in THE $13 TRILLION QUESTION 1, 1–27. The other argues for a 
longer duration. See John H. Cochrane, A New Structure for U.S. Federal Debt, in 
THE $13 TRILLION QUESTION 91, 91–139. Both papers implicitly assume that the risk 
of a rollover crisis is so minute that it has no relevance to the analysis. See Cochrane, 
at 91–139; Greenwood et al., at 1–27. The “$13 Trillion” of the title is the amount of 
U.S. Treasury debt held by the public in the fall of 2015, when the papers were 
presented at a conference held at the Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy, 
which is part of the Brookings Institution. See Lawrence H. Summers, This $13 
Trillion Question Is More Important than Ever, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/10/larry-summers-this-
13-trillion-question-is-more-important-than-ever/ [https://perma.cc/987X-2KZW] 
(describing the conference). As of September 30, 2019, less than four years later, this 
“$13 Trillion” debt held by the public figure had increased to $16.80 Trillion. The 
Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURY DIRECT, 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd_debttothepenny.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GBS4-3HF2] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).   
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financing requirements of the United States government. That in turn 
would ease the adjustment shock when and if the United States 
government is unable to continue to roll over its debt. The quickest 
way to extend the duration of United States government debt is for the 
Treasury to issue perpetual bonds, along the lines of the now largely 
forgotten “consols” once issued by the government of the United 
Kingdom.193 
Extending the duration of the outstanding debt has other 
advantages. It would lock in the present relatively low interest rates. 
A perpetual bond could be issued in large quantities, creating a single 
class of U.S. Treasury bond which would have greater liquidity than 
any presently outstanding issue. Admittedly, the Treasury staff and the 
Treasury Bond Advisory Committee (known as TBAC) appear to be 
hesitant to change any of the present practices in the U.S. Treasury 
market. This is shown by the resistance to the idea put forward by 
Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin that the Treasury should 
issue 50 years bonds (30 years is presently the maximum maturity that 
the Treasury uses).194 
A large market of United States government perpetuals with 
identical terms would create a liquid trading market in United States 
obligations that would provide a highly useful barometer of the 
financial health of the United States. Although the market in United 
States government obligations is often described as the largest and 
most liquid in the world, its liquidity is undermined by the fact that it 
 
 193. See Jan Tore Klovland, Pitfalls in the Estimation of the Yield on British 
Consols, 1850-1914, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 164, 165 (1994) (“For many decades before 
World War I the price of Consols was the single most important asset price in the 
world economy.”). Corporations (and a number of governments) have been issuing 
bonds with maturities of fifty years or more. U.S. corporations are not in a position to 
consider a perpetual bond because under income tax rules the interest on a perpetual 
bond is not deductible. The income tax rules have no impact on the government 
choice. Private corporations, of course, issue a type of perpetual security in the form 
of common stock. See Mooney, supra note 1, at 12, 15 (proposing “Prosperity Shares” 
to be “structured to provide periodic payments to the holder that reflect in some 
fashion the growth of the U.S. economy and positive increases in the fiscal health of 
the U.S.”).  
 194. See Kate Davidson and Daniel Kruger, Treasury Exploring New Debt 
Products, Including 20-Year Bond, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
treasury-exploring-new-debt-products-including-20-year-bond-11572438976 
[https://perma.cc/5CUJ-8BN4] (last updated Oct. 30, 2019) (reporting that the 
Treasury Department said “it was considering several possible new debt products as 
officials seek to find more ways to attract investment as budget analysts expect years 
of continued growth in federal budget deficits,” including “adding new bonds with 
maturities of 20- and 50-years”). 
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consists of hundreds of different issues with different maturities, 
coupon rates, and so on. An outstanding issue of, for instance, $4 
trillion of 4% U.S. perpetuals would create an easily tradeable and 
shortable public market whose value would be based on investors’ 
beliefs about U.S. financial stability and likely future U.S. interest 
rates. This would be similar to the role corporate equity markets play 
in providing public information about the performance of company 
managements. 
2. Dedicated Liquidity Fund 
Our second suggestion is the establishment of a liquidity fund, 
available for government operations if a disruption should occur. 
There is already in existence an Exchange Stabilization Fund, 
controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury, which in the past has been 
deployed for purposes such as addressing the Mexican financial crisis 
in the 1990s.195 At present, the Exchange Stabilization fund totals only 
about $90 billion, less than the nation’s weekly borrowings.196 What 
we propose would provide a far larger cushion. 
The resources available to the Secretary of the Treasury to deal 
with a disruption in the United States’ access to credit markets have 
been the subject of public discussion in connection with the recent 
controversies over debt ceiling increases.197 In normal times, the debt 
limit is for practical purposes something of a paper tiger. This paper 
tiger exists because the Treasury Secretary can take advantage of the 
statutory definition of the outstanding debt in the debt-limit statute.198 
 
 195. See Anna J. Schwarz, From Obscurity to Notoriety: A Biography of the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
5699, 1996).  
 196. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT OF 
THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2019 AND 2018 (2019). 
 197. See, e.g., Kellie Lunney, As Government Hits Debt Ceiling, Treasury 
Taps Federal Pensions, THE FISCAL TIMES (March 16, 2015), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/03/16/Government-Hits-Debt-Ceiling-
Treasury-Taps-Federal-Pensions [https://perma.cc/KV5K-PKSR].  
 198. The basic debt limit statute is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 as 
supplemented by 31 U.S.C. § 3101(A), which provides an expedited procedure for 
Congressional approval of a recommended debt ceiling increase. These codified 
provisions are further supplemented by uncodified joint resolutions and 
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That statute counts as outstanding debt the debt instruments required 
to be held in the social security and other trust funds, particularly funds 
that back retirement promises to federal employees.199 However, the 
statute governing the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund 
provides that the Secretary can suspend required contributions to the 
Fund (partly derived from deductions in Civil Service employees 
paychecks) “if such additional investment could not be made without 
causing the public debt to exceed the public debt limit.”200 These funds 
must be made whole by the Secretary once the debt-ceiling crisis is 
resolved.201 This enables the Secretary to divert this cash to other cash 
needs. 
Another subsection of the same section provides that the 
Secretary can “sell or redeem . . . invested assets of the Fund before 
maturity” in order to prevent the public debt of the United States from 
exceeding the debt limit.202 This ability to sell will only be helpful as 
long as the financial markets are receptive to the Secretary’s sale. 
If the Secretary were unable to borrow from global financial 
markets on satisfactory terms, due either to legal impediments or to a 
lack of demand, and after exhausting the Exchange Stabilization Fund, 
the Treasury Secretary might turn to his friends at the Federal Reserve. 
However, the Federal Reserve is statutorily barred from buying United 
States debt directly from the Treasury.203 And even if it were allowed 
to buy treasury securities directly, the information that the Federal 
Reserve was now the buyer of last resort, paying for its purchases with 
newly printed dollars, could destabilize the markets, driving up 
interest rates, and along with it, the interest costs of the federal 
government.  
What about asset sales? Could the United States sell part of its 
gold stores and use the proceeds to fund the operations of the 
government? One problem is that the Secretary would find it difficult 
to sell this much gold quickly at the current market price. This 
difficulty is in part because the United States, although a major owner 
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of gold, has not been supportive of a deep and liquid market in gold. 
A further question is what the impact of selling the U.S. gold holdings 
would be on the credibility of its currency. Although contemporary 
macroeconomics teaches that the United States and other modern 
economies have a system of fiat money and that any gold backing is 
irrelevant,204 it is possible that news that the Treasury has found it 
necessary to sell its gold would have an impact on the financial 
markets. If so, the benefits obtained by selling the gold could be 
outweighed by the impact that the announcement of the sale would 
have on the economic prospects of the United States.205  
Could the United States sell off some land? The United States 
has immense real assets, with ownership of one-third of the land mass 
of the nation.206 The problem is that the bulk of these assets are 
encumbered by statutory requirements and fast sales would be hard 
without Congressional cooperation, which might not be forthcoming.  
It is the inadequacy of these alternatives that leads us to suggest 
a liquidity fund that the Secretary can access in the event of a financial 
disruption. The long existence of the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
shows that the idea that the Secretary of the Treasury needs access to 
discretionary funds to deal with unexpected events is well-accepted.  
The creation of a larger liquidity fund involves two important 
issues that would need to be addressed. First, how would the fund be 
governed? Second, in what form would the Fund hold its assets?  
As to the first question, we suggest having the Secretary of the 
Treasury manage the fund. Perhaps this is because we are unwisely 
admiring of the great traditions of the U.S. Treasury dating back to 
Alexander Hamilton and Albert Gallatin, and the tradition of able 
staffing and fiscal rectitude they created. It does seem that the modern 
 
 204. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 81 (7th ed. 2009) 
(explaining that “money that has no intrinsic value is called fiat money because it is 
established as money by government decree, or fiat” and that “fiat money is the norm 
in most economies today”).  
 205. On August 24, 2012, Eric M. Thorson, Inspector General, Department of 
the Treasury, responded to questions asked by Senator Orrin G. Hatch in a letter of 
January 18, 2012, about the debt ceiling crisis of July 2011. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, OIG-CA-12-006, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEBT 
CEILING ISSUES OF 2011 (2012). Thorson’s response contained the following passage: 
“Treasury officials rejected the option of selling the nation’s gold to meet payment 
obligations because selling gold would undercut confidence in the U.S. both here and 
abroad, and would be destabilizing to the world financial system.” Id. at 4. 
Apparently, the treasury officials are not confident that everyone has internalized the 
teaching of contemporary macroeconomics that contemporary money is simply fiat 
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Secretaries of the Treasury have a lesser role, and Congress might well 
decide that such a fund should be under the control of a separate board. 
It would make sense to specify the conditions under which the Fund 
would be accessible. A statute could specify, for instance, that the 
funds would only be available after the Secretary (or the Board) 
certifies that no other source of short-term cash is available to the 
government.  
With respect to the form of asset holdings: the U.S. government 
now keeps its operating funds in an account at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. The problem with using the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York for this purpose is that the assets of the Federal Reserve 
Banks, including the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, consist of 
U.S. Treasuries or GSE debt implicitly guaranteed by the United 
States. A disruption of the U.S. Treasury’s ability to borrow would 
create solvency issues for the Reserve Banks (because the U.S. 
Treasury instruments would fall in value) just as the Treasury needed 
access to its funds. Consequently, we suggest that the liquidity fund 
could hold diversified liquid assets denominated in the major 
currencies, other than U.S. Treasuries and GSEs.207 
B. The Longer Term: Preparing to Restructure  
That a restructuring of U.S. government debt would not 
necessarily trigger catastrophe for the United States does not, of 
course, mean that catastrophe is not a possible outcome. We 
acknowledge the concern that a constitutional structure that disperses 
power could compound the country’s problems in times of grave 
financial challenges. After all, divided authority can lead to 
unproductive, wasteful expenditures of energy, with the upshot that 
nothing gets done until a crisis occurs, and then what does get done is 
bad. We understand this line of thought and admit that the United 
States system has not always responded well to crises.208 We also 
recognize that we live in an age when some question the value of the 
United States constitutional system and whether it retains any of the 
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usefulness it may once have had.209 Gridlock and obstructionism, or so 
a commonly advanced argument goes, have rendered the American 
constitutional system incapable of functioning in anything akin to its 
original form.210  
But to focus only on how bad things are when politics gets bitter 
is to ignore one of the American system’s great advantages: what 
emerges from its often messy, cumbersome workings tends to have 
legitimacy and can generally be relied upon. That is precisely what 
occurred in both the Founding era and in the 1930s. In both instances, 
the federal government’s treatment of its creditors generated intense 
controversy, in large part due to the profound tensions that arose 
between forging a viable financial structure for the nation and 
respecting contract and property rights. Yet the United States was able 
to navigate these choppy waters and emerge with the access to capital 
markets it needed. These events highlight that the very constitutional 
structure that can make it hard to get things done can also enable 
credible commitments that the nation will not become a serial 
defaulter on the order of Argentina or other problem nation sovereign 
debtors. 
To realize the full potential of the United States constitutional 
system, it is crucial to understand its strengths and vulnerabilities. 
With respect to government debt, what the Constitution provides is a 
framework that creates space for crafting creative solutions to 
problems, not a rigid advance directive that sets out with specificity 
how government actors must respond in times of grave difficulty.211 
The demonstrated benefits of the flexibility that is built into the 
constitutional design is reason to be skeptical of the value of 
legislative proposals designed to prioritize interest and principal 
payments on treasury securities over other United States government 
commitments.212  
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Another feature of the United States constitutional system that 
merits attention is Congress’s “power of the purse.”213 The 
Constitution entrusts Congress with primary responsibility for the 
nation’s finances, including the powers to tax, spend, and appropriate 
funds.214 Increasingly, however, divisions of the federal government 
are drawing on non-appropriated funds for general operations.215 It is 
worth considering what the ramifications of this shift may be for 
United States government preparedness for severe financial stress.  
CONCLUSION 
If something cannot go on forever, it will not. This Article’s 
analysis has been premised on the distinct possibility that the United 
States government’s current fiscal path is unsustainable, meaning that 
in the future something will have to change. That something might, of 
course, be cuts to social security obligations, defense spending, or a 
host of other government initiatives. Or it might be steps to increase 
revenue through changes in taxation. Or it might be strategies of 
financial repression to force purchases of government debt. But big 
government programs have proven stubbornly resistant to reform, 
taxes difficult to increase, and financial repression diverts scarce 
capital from its most productive use. This leads us to think it is only 
prudent to consider the prospect that at a time of great financial stress 
voters and politicians will conclude that the best course of action, all 
things considered, includes restructuring Treasury debt.  
We hope this Article has demonstrated the central benefit of 
thinking about the previously unthinkable: we can then prepare for it. 
Our two concrete proposals—a lengthening of debt duration, 
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including through the issuance of perpetual debt instruments, and the 
creation of a liquidity fund—are designed to provide breathing space 
so that the nation can better withstand financial shocks, including the 
disruption that would result from a debt rollover crisis. We have also 
provided an initial take on the constitutional questions that would need 
resolution at the time of a restructuring. While much remains 
uncertain, we think it clear that our constitutional system provides 
ample powers for the government to address the nation’s challenges 
and that the Constitution would not operate as a hard constraint on 
restructuring the nation’s debt. 
A restructuring of United States government debt would likely 
prove painful, and not just to holders of Treasury securities. But any 
action must be compared to feasible alternatives. The standard 
responses to a full-blown debt crisis are currency debasement, messy 
default, or (relatively) orderly restructuring. We have argued that 
restructuring might well prove to be the least damaging of the three, 
in large part because our constitutional system has the capacity to 
make credible a United States government commitment not to engage 
in serial debt default going forward.  
 
